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SIXTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENTS-
EROSION OF DEFENDANT'S RIGHT
TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY AND A
FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR TRIAL
Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Darden v. Wainwright,I the Supreme Court upheld Willie Jas-
per Darden's murder conviction and death sentence in Florida state
court.2 Darden appealed the result on three separate grounds,
claiming, first, that one member of the jury venire had been improp-
erly excluded for cause, based on his attitude toward the death pen-
alty, 3 depriving Darden of his sixth amendment right to an impartial
jury; second, that during the closing argument of the guilt phase of
his trial the prosecutors' remarks rendered the trial fundamentally
unfair, depriving the sentence of the eighth amendment's require-
ment of reliability; 4 and, third, that Darden was deprived of the ef-
fective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment. 5
In rejecting each of Darden's claims, the Court interpreted and
applied the standards it developed in past cases pertaining to each
kind of challenge. Because each of the standards had recently been
established or re-examined by the Supreme Court, their application
in this case has considerable significance for the future determina-
tion of these types of constitutional claims.
This Note argues that the standards established by the Court to
evaluate claims of improper juror exclusion for cause and
prosecutorial misconduct as affecting the fairness of the trial were
misapplied in this case. The Note concludes, therefore, that the
Court wrongly decided these two challenges to the validity of
1 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986).
2 Id. at 2466.
3 Id.
4 Id. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
5 Id. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury'... and
to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Darden's conviction and death sentence. The Note also concludes,
however, that the Court correctly decided the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel because, under the circumstances of this case,
the Court properly applied and satisfied the standard which it has
developed to measure this type of challenge to a sentence.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Darden was convicted in a Florida court of murder, robbery and
assault with intent to kill in January 1974." Under Florida's bifur-
cated trial system, the judge accepted the jury's nonbinding recom-
mendation as to the penalty, and he was sentenced to death.
7
On September 8, 1973, in a small store near Lakeland, Florida,8
a black male fatally shot Carl Turman, robbed and sexually as-
saulted his wife, Helen, and severely wounded their sixteen year-old
neighbor, Phillip Arnold.9 Another neighbor later described a car
she saw leaving the store just after the murder.' 0 Shortly after the
crimes, Darden, who was on a furlough from prison at the time,
crashed his borrowed car a few miles away from the store."1 Darden
left the accident scene before police arrived and got a ride to
Tampa, Florida.' 2 The police suspected that the driver of the
wrecked car was Mr. Turman's killer because of the proximity of the
accident in time and place to the scene of the murder.' 3 The car
also matched the description of the one seen leaving the store.
1 4
The police searched the crash site and found a revolver which was
the type used to shoot Carl Turman and Phillip Arnold. 15 Darden
was arrested the next day in Tampa.' 6 Both Helen Turman and
Phillip Arnold identified Darden from photographs and at trial as
the murderer.
17
6 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2466.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 2467. The Court sets out the facts in considerable detail--more... than is
normally necessary," see id. at 2467-68-because of the intimate connection between
those facts and the way the majority decides Darden's claims.
9 Id. at 2467-68.





15 Id. See infra note 150 for a discussion of inconclusive evidence bearing on
whether this gun was actually the murder weapon.
16 106 S. Ct. at 2468.
17 Id. The fact that there were discrepancies in the descriptions of both witnesses, id.
at 2468-69 n. 1, and some questionable procedures followed in showing the photographs
to the victims and in isolating Darden when Mrs. Turman and Phillip first saw him in
person, id. at 2481 nn.4-5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), is important to the dissent's disa-
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The jury selection process gave rise to the first ground upon
which Darden appealed his conviction and sentence. During voir
dire, the trial court excluded several potential jurors for cause on the
basis of their attitudes toward the death penalty.' 8 The judge ex-
plained to the entire venire that he wanted to know whether any of
them had "such strong religious, moral, or conscientious principles
in opposition to the death penalty that [they] would be unwilling to
vote to return an advisory sentence recommending the death sen-
tence even though the facts . . .should be such as under the law
would require that recommendation."' 19 During the individual
questioning, however, the judge did not specifically ask one of the
excluded jurors whether he would actually be unable to recommend
the death penalty regardless of the facts of the case.
20
The second ground of appeal concerned the conduct of the
prosecution during its closing argument to the jury. The prosecu-
tors made a series of comments2 1 focusing on their personal belief
greement with the majority over whether the jury's assessment of the evidence was
prejudiced by the prosecutors' comments. See infra text accompanying notes 149-54.
18 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2470 n.3.
19 Id. at 2469. The trial judge broadly based this statement on the language of
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), see infra note 90, but he failed to interpret
the standard correctly.
20 Id. at 2470; see also id. at 2484 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
21 " 'As far as I am concerned, and as Mr. Maloney said as he identified this man as an
animal, this animal was on the public for one reason.'
"'He shouldn't be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him and a prison guard at the
other end of that leash.'"
"'I wish [Mr. Turman] had had a shotgun in his hand when he walked in the back door
and blown his [Darden's] face off. I could see him sitting here with no face, blown away
by a shotgun.'"
" 'I wish someone had walked in the back door and blown his head off at that point.'"
"'He fired in the boy's back, number five saving one. Didn't get a chance to use it. I
wish he had used it on himself.'"
"'I wish he had been killed in the accident, but he wasn't. Again, we are unlucky that
time.' "
Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2471-72 n.11-12 (1986)(quoting the Rec-
ord)(emphasis added).
"'I wish that person or persons responsible for him being on the public was in the
doorway instead of Mr. Turman... I wish that he had been the one shot in the mouth
"'He is a prisoner. He is supposed to be. Mr. Turman is dead because of that unknown
defendant we don't have in the courtroom .... '
" 'I cannot help but wish that the Division of Corrections was sitting in the chair with
him.'"
Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031, 1035 n.11 (11 th Cir. 1983) (quoting the Record).
Prosecutor White stated that he was "'convinced, as convinced as I know I am standing
before you today, that Willie Jasper Darden is a murderer, that he murdered Mr.
Turman, that he robbed Mrs. Turman and that he shot to kill Phillip Arnold. I will be
convinced of that the rest of my life.'" Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2477
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting the Appendix).
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in Darden's guilt and their personal feelings toward him. Although
the trial court told the jury that these remarks were not "evidence"
on which they were to base their verdict,22 it failed either to correct
the prosecutors' behavior or to tell the jury to completely disregard
the statements.
23
Darden appealed his conviction and death sentence to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court, raising the claims of improper juror exclusion
and prosecutorial misconduct. 24 That court affirmed his convic-
tion,25 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari26 on
the issue of prosecutorial misconduct27 but later dismissed the writ
as improvidently granted.2 8
His state remedies exhausted, Darden sought habeas corpus re-
lief in federal district court,29 where his petition was denied. 30 The
court of appeals affirmed, first by a divided panel3' and later by an
equally divided court after rehearing en banc.32 The same court
later reversed the district court on the juror exclusion claim after a
second rehearing en banc,33 and the Supreme Court again granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded to the court of ap-
peals.34 Upon remand and reconsideration, the court of appeals de-
nied Darden any relief,35 after which he applied to the Supreme
"'Well, let me tell you something: if I am ever over in that chair over there, facing life
or death ... I guarantee you I will lie until my teeth fall out.'" Id.
"I will ask you to advise the Court to give him death. That's the only way I know
that he is not going to get out on the public. It's the only way I know. It's the only
way I can be sure of it. It's the only way anybody can be sure of it now, because the
people that turned him loose-"
Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2471 n.10 (1986)(quoting the Record).
22 106 S. Ct. at 2472.
23 Id. at 2480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
24 Darden v. State, 329 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1976).
25 Id. at 291.
26 Darden v. Florida, 429 U.S. 917 (1976).
27 Darden v. Florida, 429 U.S. 1036 (1977).
28 Darden v. Florida, 430 U.S. 704 (1977).
29 106 S. Ct. at 2467. It was at this point in the procedural history that Darden first
claimed he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. Id. He asserted that his
attorneys had failed to present mitigating evidence prior to sentencing. See infra notes
165-67 and accompanying text.
30 Darden v. Wainwright, 513 F. Supp. 947 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
31 Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
32 Darden v. Wainwright, 708 F.2d 646 (11th Cir. 1983)(en banc).
33 Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1985)(en banc).
34 Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2467 (1986). The court of appeals was
instructed to reconsider in light of the decision in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412
(1985). Id.
35 Darden v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1985).
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Court for a stay of execution, which was granted. 36 The Court dealt
with the three separate issues raised by Darden in the order in which
they related to incidents during the trial.
37
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, rejected each claim, af-
firming both the conviction and the sentence.38 First, he found that
under the standard outlined in Wainwright v. Witt, 39 which requires
that the court determine "whether the juror's views on capital pun-
ishment would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of
his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath,' ",40 the voir dire record in Darden's case showed that the trial
court properly excluded the one juror for cause.41 The Court
granted wide discretion to the trial judge to evaluate the excluded
juror and to decide, under all the circumstances of the voir dire ques-
tioning, whether his performance of his duty would be impaired.
42
Second, the majority held that the trial had not been rendered
fundamentally unfair by the prosecution's misconduct during clos-
ing arguments, because the context in which the remarks were made
was such that the jury's deliberations were not likely to have been
influenced by them.43 Justice Powell stated that most of the im-
proper remarks were either made in response to improper defense
comments or their effect was mitigated by further remarks of the
defense attorneys. 44
Finally, the Court rejected the claim of denial of effective assist-
ance of counsel, basing its decision on the recent case of Strickland v.
Washington.45 That case established a deferential standard by which
a reviewing court is to judge the adequacy of defense counsel's per-
formance. The Strickland standard requires the defendant to prove
both that his attorney's representation was so deficient that it
amounted to no representation and that his whole defense was actu-
36 The Court "treated [the application] as a petition for certiorari and granted [it]
.... 106 S. Ct. at 2467.
37 Id. at 2469.
38 Id. at 2475.
39 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
40 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Wilt, 469 U.S. at 424).
41 106 S. Ct. at 2471.
42 Id. at 2470.
43 Id. at 2472-73.
44 Id.
45 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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ally prejudiced by the deficiency. 46 Although there are two parts to
the Strickland test, the Court reached only the first part, finding that
Darden had failed to prove that his attorney's performance fell be-
low "an objective standard of reasonableness," 47 and thus he did
not show that the performance was deficient.
B. THE DISSENT
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Ste-
vens, sharply dissented from the Court's holdings as to the claims of
improper juror exclusion and prosecutorial misconduct.48 Justice
Blackmun rebuked the majority for its refusal to do anything but
"wring its hands when a State uses improper legal standards to se-
lect juries in capital cases and permits prosecutors to pervert the
adversary process.'
49
The dissenting opinion concluded that the requirements of
Wainwright v. Witt were not met in this case.50 Justice Blackmun as-
serted that the trial judge evaluated the statements of the excused
venireman under an incorrect legal standard, which meant that his
conclusion that the juror should be excluded was unreliable. 51 Be-
cause of this error, the dissenters believed, the death sentence
should have been vacated.
52
Justice Blackmun even more harshly attacked the majority's
view that the prosecutors' misconduct during their closing argu-
ment did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. He based his
argument on the nature of the determination the jury had to make
in this case. Justice Blackmun wrote that because the question was
the credibility of Darden as against that of the eyewitnesses, the im-
proper and highly inflammatory remarks made by the prosecutors
were precisely the sort that are likely to taint the jury's delibera-
46 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Specifically, the Darden Court stated that "petitioner
must show that 'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness' "and that" 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" 106 S. Ct. at 2473-74
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 & 694).
47 106 S. Ct. at 2475.
48 Id. at 2476-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent makes no reference to the
claim of denial of effective assistance of counsel, apparently concurring with the majority
view that it was without merit.
49 Id. at 2485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 2482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 2483 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52 "In Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976), the Court held that the improper exclu-




tions. 53 For this reason, the dissent strongly insisted that Darden
did not receive a fair trial and that his conviction and death sentence
should not stand.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. THE COURT'S MISAPPLICATION OF STANDARDS FOR JUROR
EXCLUSION
The Court's decision on the exclusion issue exemplifies the
confusion caused by its recent modification of Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois,54 which held that potential jurors in capital cases could not be
excluded for cause "simply because they voiced general objections
to the death penalty or expressed conscientious principles against
its infliction." 55 As Justice Powell noted in his majority opinion, the
current standards for determining whether a juror may be, or has
been, properly excluded were set forth in Wainwright v. Witt,56 a re-
cent case modifying the Witherspoon doctrine. 57 The Court devel-
oped the Witherspoon doctrine in response to its recognition that "in
its role as arbiter of the punishment to be imposed," a jury which
has been systematically purged of members who have any doubts
about capital punishment does not constitute an impartial jury
within the meaning of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 58 The
Court's development of the Witherspoon-Witt doctrine and applica-
tion of that standard in Darden illustrate the present lack of clear
guidelines for evaluating claims of improper juror exclusion in capi-
tal cases.
1. The Development of the Witherspoon-Witt Doctrine
In Witherspoon, the Court invalidated an Illinois statute which
expressly gave the prosecution "unlimited challenges for cause" so
that potential jurors who might balk at imposing the death penalty
could be excluded.59 Although the Court devoted most of its opin-
ion to a general discussion of the principle of impartiality required
of a capital sentencing jury, the decision included a statement in a
53 Id. at 2477 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
55 Id. at 522.
56 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
57 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2469.
58 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 518. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ...... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
59 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512-13.
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footnote that subsequently came to be regarded as the crux of the
Court's holding:
60
[N]othing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a
defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen
who were in fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistaka-
bly clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of
capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be de-
veloped at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude
toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impar-
tial decision as to the defendant's guilt.6 1
Undoubtedly, courts have cited the footnote so often because it
offered the only hint of what the Supreme Court would consider
permissible grounds for exclusion for cause. The result was that the
standards enunciated in that footnote became the prevalent ones
against which the Supreme Court, lower federal courts and state
courts evaluated claims of improper juror exclusion.
6 2
In Witt, however, the Court disapproved of what it termed "rit-
60 See, e.g., Davis v. Zant, 721 F.2d 1478, 1486 (11th Cir. 1983)(measuring the de-
fendant's claim of improper juror exclusion against the two-part standard of the Wither-
spoon footnote 21), cert. denied sub. nom Davis v. Kemp, 471 U.S. 1143 (1985); Spencer v.
Zant, 715 F.2d 1562, 1576 (1 1th Cir. 1983)("[T]he Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
that exclusion of a venireperson because of opposition to the death penalty is permitted
only if the venireperson clearly indicates that he would always vote against the death
penalty or that his opposition to the death penalty would impair his ability to discharge
his duties as ajuror: ... " [quoting a case for its citation of footnote 21].); Hance v. Zant,
696 F.2d 940, 954 (11th Cir.)(citing footnote 21 as the "mandate" of Witherspoon to
which the lower court must adhere), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983); O'Bryan v. Es-
telle, 691 F.2d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 1982)(citing footnote 21 as the only standard of im-
properjuror exclusion); Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 677 (5th Cir. 1981) (In finding
improper exclusion, the court analyzed the juror's statements according to the two
prongs of footnote 21: the statements "f[e]ll far short of an affirmation by [the juror]
that he would automatically vote against the death penalty regardless of the evidence, or
that his objections to capital punishment would prevent him from making an impartial
decision as to guilt."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982); Burns v. Estelle, 626 F.2d 396,
397-98 (5th Cir. 1980)(en banc) (holding that a juror was improperly excluded because
her statements "f[e]ll short of unequivocal avowals disqualifying her under either aspect
of Witherspoon's two-pronged test," citing footnote 21); People v. Valesquez, 28 Cal. 3d
461, 461, 622 P.2d 952, 953, 171 Cal. Rptr. 507, 508 (1980)(citing footnote 21 as the
standard set out in Witherspoon); People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 351-52, 430 N.E.2d
1046, 1051 (1981)(citing footnote 21 as the "delineation of the permissible bases for
excluding ajuror" and citing several cases that adhered to that standard), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 1001 (1982).
61 Witherspoon, 491 U.S. at 522-23 n.21 (emphasis in original). The Court also em-
phasized that not the validity of convictions but rather, only the validity of sentences,
and then only of death sentences, would be affected by the Witherspoon holding. Id.
62 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 418 (1985). See also id. at 868 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("The label 'dictum' does not begin to convey the status that the restrictions
embodied in footnote 21 have achieved in this Court and state and federal courts over
the last decade and a half.").
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ualistic adherence" to a particular verbal formula 63 as a means of
determining which potential jurors could properly be excluded.
The Court referred to its opinion in Lockett v. Ohio 64 to support its
implicit claim that the first part of the standard, referring to exclu-
sion of jurors who would "automatically" vote against the death
penalty regardless of the circumstances, 65 had been abandoned
some years before Witt. 6 6 The focus on the word "automatically,"
however, glosses over the import of the Witherspoon standard, which
permits the exclusion of a venireperson who has made "unmistaka-
bly clear" that he or she would not be able to follow the law in ac-
cordance with the judge's instructions if that involved returning a
penalty of death.67 Yet this standard was precisely the one that the
Court actually applied to the validity of the death sentence in Lockett.
"Each of the excluded veniremen in this case made it 'unmistakably
clear' that they could not be trusted to 'abide by existing law' and 'to
follow conscientiously the instructions' of the trial judge." 68 The
first part of the Witherspoon standard merely stated that a court could
properly exclude for cause a prospective juror who made it clear
that he could never impose the death penalty, even in the presence
of circumstances for which state law deemed death an appropriate
punishment. In that case, the juror has indicated that he cannot fol-
low the instructions and the applicable law. Under Lockett and the
first part of Witherspoon the test for exclusion was the same.
Still, the Court in Witt asserted that its standards had changed
"markedly" since Witherspoon,69 attributing this transformation pri-
marily to the case of Adams v. Texas. 70 Adams involved a challenge to
a death sentence imposed by ajury in a bifurcated trial similar to the
one at issue in Darden. The thrust of Adams involved the second
63 Id. at 419. The Court quoted Witherspoon's footnote 21 as the language to which
"ritualistic adherence" was unnecessary. Id.
64 438 U.S. 586 (1978). In Lockett, the petitioner claimed that four venire members
had been improperly excluded under the Witherspoon standard. Id. at 595. In question-
ing those four, the trial judge asked each "is your conviction so strong that you cannot
take an oath [to judge the evidence impartially and follow the law], knowing that a possi-
bility exists in regard to capital punishment?" Id. at 595-96. Simply because the trial
court did not ask jurors whether they would automatically refuse to impose the death
penalty, and the Supreme Court did not insist that the word "automatically" be included
in the questioning, the Court in Witt implied that the substance of the entire first part of
the Witherspoon test had changed. Witt, 469 U.S. at 419.
65 See supra text accompanying note 61.
66 469 U.S. at 419.
67 See supra text accompanying note 61.
68 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978) (quoting Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S.
478, 484 (1969)).
(9 itt, 469 U.S. at 421.
70 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
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prong of the Witherspoon test. This prong permitted the exclusion of
jurors who could not separate their beliefs about capital punish-
ment, which was not to be considered until the penalty stage of trial,
from the decision jurors had to make at the guilt stage. The nega-
tive attitudes of some jurors toward capital punishment would inter-
fere with their impartiality at the preceding determination of guilt,
and, under the second prong of Witherspoon, they could properly be
excluded.7' The second Witherspoon standard was particularly rele-
vant to the facts of Adams because the sentencing system used in
Texas mandated the penalty of death if the jury answered three fac-
tual questions affirmatively.7 2 Justice White, writing for the Court,
explicitly recognized that the "touchstone of the inquiry" was not
whether potential jurors could follow instructions and the law, but
whether they would be impeded in their responsibility to answer the
three questions by the knowledge that the death penalty would defi-
nitely be imposed if all were answered in the affirmative. 73 In other
words, the inquiry was whether "their attitude toward the death
penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to
the defendant's guilt."
'7 4
The Witt Court incorrectly found that Adams significantly de-
parted from the standards of Witherspoon. The Court in Witt at-
tached itself to a single passage from Justice White's opinion, which
did not change the substance of the Witherspoon guidelines, and rep-
resented it as a substantively altered test. The Adams Court, review-
ing the prior decisions on the subject of juror exclusion, concluded
that "[t]his line of cases establishes the general proposition that a
juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capi-
tal punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with
his instructions and his oath."'75
The Court characterized this statement as a "general proposi-
71 See supra text accompanying note 61.
72 Adams, 448 U.S. at 40-41.
The jury is then required to answer the following questions based on evidence ad-
duced during either phase of the trial: "(1) whether the conduct of the defendant
that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the rea-
sonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; (2)
whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the
evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unrea-
sonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased."
Id. (quoting TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. Art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1979)).
73 Id. at 49.
74 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21 (emphasis in original).




tion" because Adams did not purport to alter the Witherspoon doc-
trine. In fact, the Court stated approvingly that the two-part test set
out in footnote twenty-one of Witherspoon "seems clearly designed to
accommodate the State's legitimate interest in obtaining jurors who
could follow their instructions and obey their oaths."-76 In Witt, Jus-
tice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, asserted that the whole stan-
dard for evaluating the exclusion of jurors had been "simplified."
He stated that Adams "merged" the two parts of the Witherspoon
test.77 Justice Rehnquist lifted that single passage out of context
fromJustice White's opinion in Adams and treated the passage as if it
had revamped the Witherspoon two-fold standard. 78
As part of the capital sentencing procedure at issue in Adams,
Texas required jurors to state under oath that a mandatory death
penalty resulting from affirmative answers to the three statutory
questions "would not 'affect [their] deliberations on any issue of
fact.' "79 Jurors who could not take the oath were excluded. The
Court held that jurors could not properly be excluded on the basis
of their inability to swear this oath because whether jurors' delibera-
tions would be "affected" by the possible imposition of the death
penalty was an overly broad test.80 This test excluded not only ju-
rors who indicated that they would be impeded in their duty to an-
swer the questions impartially, but it also excluded those jurors who
had not made clear that they were unwilling or unable to perform
that duty.
Justice White explained that "neither nervousness, emotional
involvement, nor inability to deny or confirm any effect whatsoever
is equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability on the part of the
76 Adams, 448 U.S. at 44.
77 469 U.S. at 421. "The tests with respect to sentencing and guilt, originally in two
prongs, have been merged; the requirement that a juror may be excluded only if he
would never vote for the death penalty is now missing .... " Id.
78 Justice Rehnquist's attempt in Witt to define Adams as totally replacing the Wither-
spoon test seems to have more to do with his doctrinal preferences than it does with the
actual Adams holding. In dissent in Adams, he complained that the decision came "at a
time when this Court should be re-examining the doctrinal underpinnings of Witherspoon
in light of our intervening decisions in capital cases .... " Adams, 448 U.S. at 52 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
79 448 U.S. at 40.
80 Id. at 50-51. The Texas scheme, Justice White said, allowed the exclusion of those
whose only fault was to take their responsibilities with special seriousness or to ac-
knowledge honestly that they might or might not be affected. It does not appear in
the record before us that these individuals were so irrevocably opposed to capital
punishment as to frustrate the State's legitimate efforts to administer its constitu-
tionally valid death penalty scheme.
The exclusion of all such jurors, the Court continued, was constitutionally impermissi-
ble. Id.
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jurors to follow the court's instructions and obey their oaths, re-
gardless of their feelings about the death penalty."8 1 The Court in
Adams thus reaffirmed the Witherspoon doctrine. Adams held that
Texas could only exclude jurors who had made clear their inability
or unwillingness to answer the questions impartially without regard
to whether the death penalty would be imposed. This standard
complies with the second Witherspoon prong, permitting exclusion of
jurors who made clear their inability to make "an impartial decision
as to the defendant's guilt."8 2 The relevant inquiry in each case was
whether the juror's ability to judge the guilt of the defendant would
clearly be impaired by the existence of a possible death sentence.8
3
The applicable standards enunciated in Wainwright v. Witt and
upon which the Supreme Court decided the claim of improper ex-
clusion of a juror for cause in Darden v. Wainwright were based
largely on either a misunderstanding or a deliberate remodeling of
the Court's path since Witherspoon. The Court's rejection of
Darden's claim reflects the confusion that results when standards for
evaluating the constitutionality of the voir dire process are vague and
inconsistent.
2. The Misapplication of the Witherspoon and Witt
Standards in Darden
Darden based his claim of improper juror exclusion on a ques-
tion asked by the trial court of one member of the venire, who was
excluded for cause when he answered affirmatively.8 4 The judge
asked: "Do you have any moral or religious, conscientious moral or
religious principles in opposition to the death penalty so strong that
you would be unable without violating your own principles to vote to
recommend a death penalty regardless of the facts?"8' 5 The Court
ultimately held that, in the circumstances of the case, the exclusion
of the juror was justified under the legal standard set forth in Wain-
81 Id. at 50.
82 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21 (emphasis in original).
83 Justice White's opinion demonstrates his adherence to the two-fold inquiry under
Witherspoon: "If the juror is to obey his oath and follow the law of Texas, he must be
willing not only to accept that in certain circumstances death is an acceptable penalty but
also to answer the statutory questions without conscious distortion or bias." Adams, 448
U.S. at 46. The first condition is drawn from the first prong of Witherspoon, which per-
mits exclusion of jurors who will never impose the death penalty regardless of the cir-
cumstances of the case, and the second parallels Witherspoon's second standard, which
permits exclusion ofjurors who cannot judge the evidence impartially, without "distor-
tion or bias." Id.
84 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2469-70.
85 Id. at 2470 (emphasis added). See infra text accompanying notes 97-98 for a dis-
cussion of why the standard implicit in the question is incorrect.
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wright v. Wilt.86 That standard was comprised of the language that
the majority had taken from Adams v. Texas: "whether the juror's
views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath.' "87
By examining the context in which Murphy, the excluded
venireman, was questioned to determine whether his exclusion
could be justified,88 the Court implicitly recognized that, as Darden
argued, the single question asked individually of Murphy did not
reflect the proper legal standard. The Court reviewed the record of
the voir dire, which indicated that the judge had questioned each
member of the jury venire in the presence of all the others.8 9 From
this fact the Court concluded that even if the direct questioning of
Murphy himself did not conform to Witt guidelines, he had heard,
and presumably understood, the "correct standard" being used in
the questions put to others. 90
Even if this assumption were justified, its validity would depend
on whether the trial court actually applied the correct legal standard
in its questioning of the whole venire. The particular question
asked of Murphy91 did not, under Witt, sufficiently address whether
he would be able to follow his instructions and perform his duties as
a juror.92 The Court in Darden used a number of examples of the
questioning of other jurors, which included the qualification that
their beliefs about capital punishment would prevent them from rec-
ommending it regardless of the evidence.
93
The Court's reasoning is flawed because, as Justice Blackmun's
86 Id. at 2470-71.
87 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)(quoting Adams, 448 U.S. at 45.).
88 106 S. Ct. at 2469.
89 Id. at 2469-70.
90 Id. at 2470. But see id. at 2484 (Blackmun, J., dissenting):
I find implausible the Court's assumption that Murphy followed closely the day-long
questioning of other jurors. But if that assumption were correct, then the Court
should also assume that Murphy anticipated being asked whether his beliefs would
prevent or substantially impair performance of his duties as a juror, as other jurors
expressing similar sentiments had been asked.
It should be noted that, although the Court applied the Witt test to the trial judge's
conduct of voir dire, the 1974 trial took place eleven years before that decision, and
Witherspoon, decided in 1968, then provided the established standard. See id. at 2484 n.8
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although pretrial discussion on the Record showed that the
judge was aware of the Witherspoon decision, see Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031,
1038 n.17 (11 th Cir. 1983), it is even more difficult to maintain that his questioning of
Murphy conforms to the Witherspoon standard than to the Witt test. See infra note 97 and
accompanying text.
91 See supra text accompanying note 85.
92 See supra text accompanying note 87.
93 106 S. Ct. at 2470 n.3.
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dissent points oUt,9 4 it is questionable whether Murphy would have
assumed, based on the questions asked of others, that he was being
asked whether his principles would prevent him from recom-
mending the death penalty under any circumstances, absent an ex-
plicit question to that effect. In the absence of the appropriate
question, "Murphy was never given an opportunity to state whether
his views would prevent or impair the performance of his duties."9 5
The trial judge, thus, based his conclusion that Murphy should be
excluded on incomplete information that did not meet the Supreme
Court's requirements. Those requirements demand that the trial
court determine that a juror's attitude toward capital punishment
would cause an inability to perform his or her duties according to
the law. Under these circumstances, the Court's holding that "the
trial court's decision to exclude this juror was proper,"96 can hardly
be supported.
The trial judge demonstrated his fundamental misunderstand-
ing of the Witherspoon standard when, in explaining his denial of a
pretrial motion to restrict voir dire on the subject, he stated:
It is my ruling if a prospectvejuror states on his voir dire examination
that, because of his moral, religious or conscientious principles and
belief he would be unwilling to recommend a death penalty, even
though the facts and circumstances meet the requirements of law, then
he in effect has said he would be unwilling to follow the law the court
shall charge upon it and disregard and be unwilling to follow it or if he
did follow it, it would be going against his principles, and therefore, I would
rule that would be disqualification.
97
The trial judge thus stated that he would disqualify a prospec-
tive juror who indicated that he could follow the law even though it
would go against his principles. Any such disqualification would
mean excluding ajuror who had not shown he was unable or unwill-
ing to follow the law and would be inconsistent with the Witherspoon
standards. In the majority opinion, however, only part of the quote
from the trial judge appears. The Court deleted the phrase, "or if
he did follow it, it would be going against his principles." 98 With
the inclusion of that phrase, it is readily apparent that the trial court
had misconstrued the law. The omission of the phrase in Justice
Powell's opinion indicates a disturbing willingness on the part of the
94 See supra note 90.
95 Darden v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 752, 761 (11th Cir. 1985)(en banc)(Clark, J.,
dissenting).
96 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2471.
97 Id. at 2483 n.7 (Blackmun,J., dissenting)(quoting the Appendix)(emphasis added).
98 Id. at 2470 n.2.
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majority either to overlook or to disguise lower court errors which
disadvantage a defendant.
Because the trial court in this case did not apply the correct
standard, whether under Witherspoon or Witt, in excluding Murphy
from serving on the jury which ultimately sentenced Darden to
death, Darden's claim of improper exclusion should have been up-
held by the Supreme Court. As one of the dissenting court of ap-
peals judges explained, a factual finding-here, a finding that
Murphy could properly be excluded because his beliefs would im-
pair his ability to serve as ajuror-resting on an incorrect legal stan-
dard should not be permitted to stand, because there has not been a
reliable and legitimate determination of the issue depending on
those facts.99 In this case, where the issue was whether Darden's
constitutional right to an impartial jury had been denied him, the
Court should have been less eager to find that there was no error in
the determination of the facts on which that issue depended.
B. THE COURT'S MISUSE OF THE STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS
The Court also wrongly rejected Darden's claim that the prose-
cution's closing argument at the guilt phase of trial "rendered the
trial fundamentally unfair and deprived the sentencing determina-
tion of the reliability required by the Eighth Amendment."10 0
The Court applied a test first established in Donnelly v. DeChris-
toforo 101 to the allegedly prejudicial argument. Under this test, the
Court asked whether the remarks had " 'so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due pro-
cess.' '102 Although finding that the challenged remarks were
clearly improper, 10 3 the Court held that Darden had not been de-
prived of a fair trial. 10
4
Justice Powell began his analysis by sketching the circumstances
under which the improper remarks were made. He particularly em-
phasized the fact that Mr. McDaniel, the prosecutor who made most
of the remarks at issue, 10 5 was responding to the initial summation
99 See Darden v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 752, 758 (11th Cir. 1985)(en banc)(Johnson,
J., dissenting).
100 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2466.
101 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
102 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2472 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643).
103 Id. at 2471. Justice Powell conceded that "[the] argument deserves the condemna-
tion it has received from every court to review it ......
104 Id. at 2472.
105 Two lawyers divided the state's closing argument, but "[n]either prosecutor's con-
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by Darden's attorney.10 6 Indeed, the majority opinion appears to
weigh this factor more heavily than any other in its determinination
that Darden was not deprived of a fair trial. The opinion implicitly
censures the defense statement, "which blamed the Polk County
Sheriff's Office for a lack of evidence, alluded to the death penalty,
characterized the perpetrator of the crimes as an 'animal,' and con-
tained counsel's personal opinion of the strength of the State's evi-
dence,"' 1 7 thereby giving the impression that excesses of Darden's
own counsel had caused the prosecution's outrageous remarks.'0 8
In characterizing the prosecution's comments as caused by the
defense, the majority tried to show that any prejudice to Darden was
not so severe as to deprive him of a fundamentally fair trial. The
approach "is used not to excuse improper comments, but to deter-
mine their effect on the trial as a whole."' 0 9 The Court cited United
States v. Young ' 10 for its discussion of the doctrine of "invited re-
sponse.""' The Court explained in Young that the concept is ap-
plied when a reviewing court can balance improper remarks by the
prosecution against similarly inappropriate preceding defense argu-
ments and can conclude that the jury's ability to properly judge the
evidence was not prejudiced. 112 In Young, however, the respective
defense and prosecution remarks differed qualitatively in their rela-
tion to one another from those in Darden.
The defense attorney in Young not only charged the prosecution
with unfair treatment of the case and attempting to "poison" the
minds of the jury,"13 but he also implied that the state had withheld
evidence and accused his opponent of not believing that his client
was guilty.114 In other words, defense counsel in Young directed an
essentially personal attack against opposing counsel. In response,
duct was an ethical model worth emulation." Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031,
1033 n.2 (1 th Cir. 1983).
106 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2471.
107 Id. (footnotes omitted).
108 See supra note 21 for a description of some of the "objectionable content [that]
was invited by or was responsive to the opening summation of the defense." 106 S. Ct.
at 2472.
109 Id. (citation omitted).
110 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
111 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2472.
112 Young, 470 U.S. at 12-13. Although stating that the preferred course would be for
the trial judge to put a stop to improper remarks by one advocate before his or her
opponent felt compelled to retaliate, if necessary giving the jury a curative instruction,
id., the Court found the idea of "invited response" a helpful guide to appellate courts
which were forced to consider the "probable effect" a prosecutor's comments had had
on the jury after the fact. Id.
113 Id. at4.
114 Id. at 4-5.
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without objecting to the comments and with no curative action by
the judge,1 15 the prosecutor stated his belief in the defendant's
guilt."16 He also attempted to rebut his opponent's assertion that
the defendant was the only one involved in the trial to "'have acted
with honor and with integrity' ""17 by stating that he would not de-
scribe Young's conduct as acting with honor and integrity. The
prosecutor then expressed disbelief that the jury could disagree." 8
In this context the Court found that although both sets of argu-
ments breached accepted standards of advocacy,119 those of the
prosecution, when balanced by those of the defense, were not such as
"to undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute
to a miscarriage of justice."'
20
The concept of invited response, if helpful when applied to the
situation in Young, is not appropriate as a tool for analyzing what
happened during the closing argument of Darden's trial. The crux
of "invited response" is that, in a specific sense, the comments of
the prosecutor were literally invited, or provoked, by those of the
defense attorney. Only if the two sets of arguments deal with the
same subject matter can the court balance one against the other to
determine whether they mitigate one another's effect. If the re-
marks do mitigate each other, it may well be, as in Young, that the
jury's deliberations were not so prejudiced as to render the trial fun-
damentally unfair. 12 In Darden, however, what the majority charac-
terizes as having been "invited by or... responsive to" the defense
summation 2 2 was a different type of argument altogether. Almost
none of the prosecutors' arguments were directly responsive to any-
thing Darden's attorney had said. 123 Instead, they consisted of "a
115 Id. at 5-6.
116 Id. at 5. The prosecutor qualified his statement somewhat by adding "'if we are
allowed to give our personal impressions since it was asked of me.' " Id. (emphasis
omitted).
117 Id. This remark by defense counsel left jurors with the suggestion of generally
questionable conduct on the part of the prosecution.
118 Id. at 5-6.
119 Id. at 9. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNC-
TION Standard 3-5.8(b) (1979)(stating that "lilt is unprofessional conduct for the prose-
cutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any
testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant."). Accord MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(e) (1981)(stating that a lawyer shall not "state a personal
opinion as to ... the guilt or innocence of an accused.").
120 Young, 470 U.S. at 20.
121 See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text. See also Young, 470 U.S. at 20.
122 See supra note 108.
123 Defense counsel referred to the death penalty, telling the jury, "'they come up
here and ask Citrus County people to kill the man .... The question is, do they have
enough evidence to kill that man, enough evidence? And I honestly do not think they
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series of utterly tasteless and repulsive"' 124 expressions of personal
hatred toward the defendant, a tirade against the state's parole sys-
tem, a personal opinion as to Darden's guilt, a heavy-handed sug-
gestion that Darden was lying, and a plea to the jury to recommend
a death sentence to avoid future consequences of Darden remaining
alive.12
5
This sustained course of misconduct, aptly described by the dis-
sent as a "relentless and single-minded attempt to inflame the
jury,"' 126 was a far more egregious violation of standards of court-
room conduct than anything done by the Young prosecutor.1 27 Nor
was the conduct in Darden comparable to that attacked in Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo,12s the case which established the standard the Court
used to evaluate Darden's claim. 129 In Donnelly, the prejudice was
alleged to have resulted from two remarks made by the prosecutor,
one of which may have misled the jury into believing that the de-
fendant had offered to plead guilty to a lesser offense.' 30 The Court
declined to find that the single remark, which it characterized as
"ambiguous"' 13 and which was immediately followed by explicit in-
do.' " Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2471 n.8 (quoting the Record). This reference cannot justify
as "invited response" the prosecutors' repeated expressions of their personal wish that
Darden was dead. The issue of whether capital punishment should be imposed has
nothing to do with wishing the defendant's head had been blown off at the scene of the
crime with a shotgun. See supra note 21. See 106 S. Ct. at 2479 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing), where the dissent makes the same argument.
Further, the defense attorney stated that the killer of Mr. Turman " 'would have to
be a vicious animal'" and that the crime was" 'the work of an animal, there's no doubt
about it,'" 106 S. Ct. at 2471 n.7 (quoting the Record). That statement showed only
that "everyone agreed that a heinous crime had been committed. ... Id. at 2479
(Blackmun,J., dissenting). It did not invite the prosecutor to state that defense counsel
had idenified Darden as an animal. See supra note 21.
124 Darden v. Wainwright, 513 F. Supp. 947, 955 (M.D. Fla. 1981). The description
could not have been more accurate, see supra note 21, yet this court also rejected
Darden's claim on this issue.
125 See supra note 21.
126 106 S. Ct. at 2478 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
127 In addition to violating section (b) of the ABA's Standard 3.58 for prosecutors, see
supra note 112, the argument repeatedly transgressed the following sections of Standard
3-5.8:
(c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or
prejudices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from
its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt
or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making predictions of
the consequences of the jury's verdict.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-5.8
(1979).
128 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
129 See supra text accompanying note 102.
130 416 U.S. at 640, 642.
131 Id. at 645.
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structions from the judge to the jury to " '[clonsider the case as
though no such statement was made,'"132 was serious enough to
have prejudiced the jury. 133 In that connection, the majority ob-
served, some types of misconduct during argument to the jury could
be so obviously prejudicial that instructions from the judge not to
consider them as evidence could not undo the damage.
1 34
The Darden case exemplifies such misconduct. Although the
trial judge instructed the jury that the arguments of counsel were
not to be considered as evidence,13 5 he also overruled defense
counsel's objections to the prosecutor's lament that Darden had not
been killed at the scene of the crime, 136 at the least blunting the
warning to the jurors. The inflammatory nature of the repeated im-
proper remarks suggests that only the strongest curative language,
applied after the first transgression, would have been sufficient to
prevent the jury from being affected in their deliberations.
Darden can also be analogized to Caldwell v. Mississippi,'
37
although the majority opinion maintained that the principles of that
case are not applicable to this one. 138 Caldwell involved a claim that
prosecutorial comments to the jurors during the sentencing phase,
-minimizing their responsibility for imposing a death sentence, de-
prived the defendant of a fair trial. 13 9 The Court in Darden implied
that the case is relevant only when precisely the same claim is being
made.140 The majority here either failed or refused to recognize
that the same effect on the jury is created in each case, because the
nature of the misconduct is the same. Yet, Justice Powell estab-
lished that it is the effect upon the jury-whether or not they were
improperly influenced by the arguments-that is the focal point of
the inquiry.14'
132 Id. at 641 (quoting the Appendix).
133 Id. at 644. See also Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2478 (1986)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134 416 U.S. at 644.
'35 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2472; id. at 2480 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
136 See supra note 21.
'37 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
138 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2473 n.15.
139 Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 324-25.
140 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2473 n.15. "In this case, none of the comments could have
had the effect of misleading the jury into thinking that it had a reduced role in the sen-
tencing process. If anything, the prosecutors' comments would have had the tendency
to increase the jury's perception of its role." Id. (emphasis omitted).
141 Id. at 2472-73. The weight of the evidence against Darden, according to the
Court, "reduced the likelihood that the jury's decision was influenced by the argument."
Id. The Court also asserted that the defense's rebuttal turned the improper
prosecutorial comments to Darden's advantage by putting them "in a light that was
more likely to engender strong disapproval than result in inflamed passions against peti-
tioner." Id. at 2473.
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The Court in Caldwell fully explained the reason that the effect
on the jury is the proper focus. Justice Marshall, the author of the
Caldwell opinion, held that the remarks of the prosecutor rendered
the trial fundamentally unfair precisely because, unlike those in Don-
nelly, 142 they were "quite focused, unambiguous, and strong. They
were pointedly directed at the issue that this Court has described as
'the principal concern' of our jurisprudence regarding the death
penalty, the 'procedure by which the State imposes the death sen-
tence.' " 143 The same analysis aptly applies to Darden. Although the
misconduct occurred in Caldwell at the sentencing phase of trial and
in Darden at the guilt phase, in both cases the improper comments
could equally have affected the jury's deliberations. Furthermore,
as the dissent pointed out, "the sentencing hearing followed imme-
diately upon the jury's return of a guilty verdict and the State's sum-
mation consisted of less than a full page of transcript," and any
effect the prosecution's arguments had on the jurors who convicted
Darden surely remained with them when they sentenced him to
death. 1
44
The majority's hasty dismissal of Caldwell is symptomatic of its
entire approach to Darden's case. The Court apparently chose to
attach little importance to the fundamental problem that exists
when a prosecutor is allowed to go on a verbal rampage of the sort
that occurred here. In Berger v. United States,145 the Court first dealt
decisively with improper prosecutorial argument, setting a standard
through its discussion of the responsibilities of an attorney for the
government, whose duty "is as much.., to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one."'146 Restraint is
necessary, continued the Court, because the government's argu-
ment is likely to carry great weight with a jury, 14 7 whose members
have no independent means of sifting apart the proper and im-
proper parts of that argument. Thus, when misconduct by the pros-
142 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
143 Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 340 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983)).
144 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2480 n.3 (1986)(Blackmun,J., dissenting). See also id. at 2474
(the majority notes that "approximately one half-hour" elapsed between the end of the
guilt phase and the beginning of the penalty phase of Darden's trial).
145 295 U.S. 78 (1935). In Berger, which involved a trial on charges of conspiring to
counterfeit, the United States Attorney made "improper insinuations and assertions cal-
culated to mislead thejury." Id. at 85. The Court found the misconduct to have been so
severely prejudicial to the defendant that stern corrective measures, even if taken by the
trial court, might not have been sufficient to purge the jury's deliberations of any im-
proper influence. Id.




ecutor goes uncorrected, "prejudice to the cause of the accused is
so highly probable that we are not justified in assuming its non-
existence."1 4
8
The importance of these principles becomes even more clear
when examined in the context of this case. The eyewitness identifi-
cations of Willie Darden by Helen Turman and Phillip Arnold 149
were probably the most important pieces of evidence against him, 15 0
and evidently the jury accepted this evidence. Because Darden con-
sistently professed his innocence of the crimes,151 the jury determi-
nation of guilt was based on their evaluation of his credibility as
against that of the two eyewitnesses. 152 Thus, the barrage of re-
marks made by the prosecution 53 was directly related to the very
issue the jury was about to decide. As the dissent cogently stated,1 54
it is improbable that the graphic argument, referring to Darden as
an animal who should be leashed and someone deserving of violent
death, would not have prejudiced those deliberations.
Rejecting the dissent's claim that the Court had found any error
in the trial to be harmless,1 55 the majority held that because the trial
had not been rendered unfair, there was no constitutional error at
all. 156 This analysis begins with the conclusion-that the jury was
not prejudiced by the prosecutor's behavior-and works backward
to construct a rationale to support the desired result. Aside from
the suspect craftsmanship of the technique, the fact that it simply
avoids the ultimate issue is disturbing. The Court in this case,
rather than deciding that thejury was not prejudiced by the prosecu-
tors' remarks and would have found Darden guilty anyway, decided
that the Court believed he was guilty. Perhaps the majority honestly
believed that the conduct of the prosecution in this case, however
unacceptable, would not have appreciably increased their own im-
148 Id. at 89.
149 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2468.
150 There was inconclusive ballistics evidence relating to a gun found near the place
where Darden had crashed his car shortly after the murder, but it was not proved either
that it actually was the murder weapon or that Darden had ever possessed it. Id. at 2482
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The most that authorities could say was that the bullets at
the site could have come from that revolver. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It was the
type the murderer had used and contained a matching pattern of spent shells. Id. at
2468.
151 Id. at 2482 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
152 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153 See supra note 21.
154 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I cannot conclude that Mc-
Daniel's sustained assault on Darden's very humanity did not affect the jury's abiltity to
judge the credibility question .... ").
155 Id. at 2480. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 2473 n.15.
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pression of Darden's guilt. That is not the question, however, that
should be asked; what the Court thinks of a defendant is completely
irrelevant to whether or not he received a fundamentally fair trial.
Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, the Court's sub-
jective conclusion that the jury was not influenced by the improper
closing argument is unreliable. Discussing the evaluation of preju-
dice upon the jury caused by an improper argument in Kotteakos v.
United States,157 Justice Rutledge, over forty years ago, displayed a
much better understanding of the focus of inquiry than does the
Court today. "The crucial thing is the impact of the thing done
wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's own, in the total
setting."'158 The right to a fundamentally fair trial is not sufficiently
protected by simply inquiring whether there was other evidence
upon which the jury could base a guilty verdict, especially when, as
in this case, the improper argument also affected some of that in-
dependent evidence. The circumstances of the Darden case are an
illustration both of why constitutional limitations on the freedom of
the prosecution in presenting its case are necessary and of the fact
that those limitations are currently inadequate.
C. APPLICATION OF THE STRICKLAND STANDARD TO THE CLAIM OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Court correctly disposed of Darden's third claim, that he
had been denied effective representation of counsel during the sen-
tencing phase of the bifurcated trial. 159 The Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the constitutional guarantee of assistance of counsel for
criminal defendants 160 to mean "effective" assistance of counsel. 16 1
Only recently, however, has the Court articulated a standard against
which claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be measured.
157 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
158 Id. at 764.
159 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2473. Darden did not raise this issue on direct appeal to the
Florida Supreme Court, bringing it for the first time during federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. Id. at 2467. The court of appeals affirmed the findings of both the federal
magistrate and the district court that the claim was without merit. Darden v. Wain-
wright, 699 F.2d 1031, 1033 (11th Cir. 1983). The magistrate, by contrast, had found
that the claims ofjuror exclusion and prosecutorial misconduct constituted grounds for
granting the writ. Id.
160 The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right... to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONsT. amend. VI.
161 See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932)(holding that assignment of
counsel for capital defendants "at such a time or under such circumstances as to pre-
cdude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case" amounts to
denial of the assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment and the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause).
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The Court relied on its decision in Strickland v. Washington 162 to
determine that Darden had not been deprived of effective assistance
of counsel at sentencing. The two-part Strickland test requires that
the defendant show, first, that his attorney's performance was so de-
ficient as to have effectively deprived him of assistance of counsel
altogether, and, second, that the defense was prejudiced by the defi-
ciency so severely as to render the result unreliable. 163 The Court
in Darden never reached the latter part of the test, because it found
that Darden had failed to show that his lawyers' performance "fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness."' 164
Darden argued that his attorneys failed to present mitigating
evidence before sentencing because of inadequate preparation and
their misinterpretation of a Florida statute listing permissible miti-
gating factors. 165 Because the decision not to mitigate could be
construed under the circumstances as a deliberate strategic choice
of the kind competent trial attorneys might make, 166 the Court con-
cluded that Darden failed to show that his lawyers' performance was
deficient under the Strickland test.' 67 This holding follows the
Court's longstanding reluctance to "infer lack of effective counsel"
where the challenged actions "might be considered sound trial
strategy."' 168 In other words, counsel are to be granted considera-
ble discretion in determining, on a case-by-case basis, the appropri-
ate range of professional behavior. Justice O'Connor, writing for
the Court in Strickland, developed this theme further, explaining that
the objective standard of reasonableness described by the Court
presupposes "prevailing professional norms" among lawyers of a
caliber sufficiently high to ensure that counsel, in general, will be
162 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
163 Id. at 687.
164 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2475.
165 Id. at 2474.
166 See id. at 2474-75. For a discussion of the probable reasons behind such a strategy,
see infra text accompanying note 172 and notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
167 Id. at 2475. The Court refuted Darden's charge of inadequate preparation by
pointing out that the Record indicated a substantial amount of time spent in preparation
for both the guilt and penalty phases of trial, id. at 2474, and declined to examine the
alleged statutory interpretation because the trial court had explicitly announced that
Darden would have free rein in presenting mitigating evidence. Consequently, the
Court stated, it could be presumed the attorneys elected not to mitigate. Id.
168 Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955). In Michel, the defendant's exper-
ienced and respected criminal lawyer failed to file a timely motion to quash an indict-
ment for rape on the ground of racial discrimination in grand jury selection. Id. at 100
& 93. The Court held that this fact, standing alone, did not show ineffective representa-
tion. Id. at 101. Absent some evidence of incompetence, the decision was "entirely
within the discretion of [defense counsel] and there were valid reasons.., at the time"
for not filing the motion. Id. at I01 n.7.
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able to provide the assistance promised by the sixth amendment. 69
The likely result of such a deferential standard of competence is
that a defendant raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
will have to prove egregious conduct on the part of his attorney to
satisfy the first part of the Strickland test. This approach lacks consis-
tency because it does not clarify the "objective standard of reasona-
bleness,"' 70  and, accordingly, the parameters of competent
representation must be developed on a case-by-case basis. 17' In
Darden, however, the Record convincingly indicated that the defense
attorneys made a thorough investigation into the defendant's back-
ground and based their decision not to introduce the information in
mitigation on the probability of it being turned against Darden by
the prosecution.
172
There can be no doubt that an attorney who failed even to con-
duct an investigation into mitigating factors before a capital sen-
tencing proceeding would be held to have fallen below the elusive
"objective" standard of reasonableness. 173 On the other hand, a
tactical decision by an attorney not to use the results of his investi-
gation "might reasonably be made when, for example, the defense
knew the prosecution would present a more severe aggravating case
169 466 U.S. at 688.
170 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2475.
171 See Note, Sixth Amendment-Defendant's Dual Burden in Claims of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 75J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 755, 771 n.133 (1984). The author suggests that,
particularly for a capital sentencing hearing, the lack of specific guidelines means that
there should be some formal pre-sentencing supervision by the trial judge, who would
examine defense counsel's preparation to determine whether efforts on the defendant's
behalf were reasonable. As the author points out, this remedy could help reduce the
burgeoning litigation of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. at 771. In addition,
in light of the Strickland holding, this method appears to be the only sort possible to
ensure some review of counsel's competence.
172 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2474. See also supra note 167.
173 See Goodpaster, The Trialfor Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases,
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299 (1983). In such a situation, "the potential for prejudice is too
obvious to require proof." Id. at 350. Even under the Strickland test, such a grave lapse
of professional responsibility would clearly have denied a defendant the right to effective
assistance of counsel, because in any capital case the sentencing authority needs to have
access to any information bearing on whether the defendant should be executed.
"Furman [v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)(holding the death penalty as applied by Geor-
gia and Texas 'cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments')] mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a mat-
ter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared,
that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)(plurality
opinion).
Thus, a complete failure to investigate would both demonstrate a severely deficient
performance by counsel and create a strong likelihood, if not an actual presumption,
that the entire defense had been prejudiced by it.
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in rebuttal to particular mitigating evidence."'' 74 As Justice Powell
noted in Darden, this result was precisely what the defense attorneys
anticipated. Justice Powell reviewed potential mitigating factors in
Darden's case, including a psychiatric report, and concluded that
the defense attorneys made a reasonable professional judgment that




In Darden v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court rejected three con-
stitutional challenges to the validity of the petitioner's murder con-
viction and death sentence. The Court wrongly decided the claims
of improper juror exclusion for cause and prosecutorial misconduct
during closing argument as affecting the fundamental fairness of
Darden's trial, but correctly held that he had not been denied effec-
tive assistance of counsel at sentencing. Under the facts of this case,
the Court had little difficulty demonstrating that Darden had not
met the Court's standard for showing ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. The Court failed to establish, however, that Darden was not
denied a fair trial because of the improper exclusion for cause of
one prospective juror based on his attitude toward capital punish-
ment. Furthermore, the egregiously prejudicial remarks made to
the jury by the prosecutors also rendered the trial fundamentally
unfair. The majority's decisions on these two issues indicate a seri-
ous disregard for the concept of procedural fairness to the defend-
ant in a criminal trial and increase the possibility of continued
erosion of the rights of the accused.
HILLARY L. PETrEGREW
174 Goodpaster, supra note 173, at 351.
175 Darden, 106 S. Ct. at 2474. Apparently the psychiatric report contained evalua-
tions of Darden which would have been very damaging to his defense had the state been
able to introduce them. Id. at 2475. Had the defense asserted that Darden was non-
violent, the state would have been free to introduce his prior convictions for violent
offenses. Id. at 2474.
Similarly, in Strickland, the Court found that the defense attorney's decision to
forego a presentencing report, because it would have introduced for the first time the
defendant's prior criminal convictions, and a psychiatric report, because of rebuttal op-
portunity for the state, among other tactical choices, 466 U.S. at 673, "was well within
the range of professionally reasonable judgments." Id. at 699.
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